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CLINTON, CAMPAIGNS, AND CORPORATE 
EXPENDITURES:  
THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT 
DECISION IN CITIZEN’S UNITED AND ITS 
IMPACT ON CORPORATE POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE  
GLEN M. VOGEL, P.E., ESQ.† 
INTRODUCTION1 
“I think we are at a very critical time in this country. I can tell 
you beyond a shadow of a doubt that uh, the Hillary Clinton that 
I know is not equipped, not qualified to be our commander in 
chief.”2 
The public’s ability to discuss and debate the character and 
fitness of presidential candidates is at the core of the First 
Amendment’s prohibition that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3  Despite the existence 
of this fundamental right, articulated so eloquently in our 
founding document, in November 2002, Congress made political 
speech a felony for one class of speakers—corporations and 
unions.4  Under the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform 
 
† Glen M. Vogel, Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in the Hofstra 
University Zarb School of Business. He would like to acknowledge and thank the 
Zarb School of Business for its generous grant to support the research efforts 
associated with this article. Gratitude also is extended to Jonathan Vecchi, Paul 
Johnson, and Eleanor Sharkey for their valuable research contributions.   
1 This Article previously appeared in the Spring 2012 edition of THE NORTH 
EAST JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, where it won the Best Paper award at the 
Annual Conference of the North East Academy of the Legal Studies of Business. See 
Glen M. Vogel, Clinton, Campaigns, and Corporate Expenditures: The Supreme 
Court’s Recent Decision in Citizen’s United and its Impact on Corporate Political 
Influence, 27 N.E. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2012). 
2 HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United 2008). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
4 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, §§ 203–04, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 81, 91–92, 94–95 (2002) (codified as amended at 
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 
S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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Act (“McCain-Feingold Act”), corporations and unions faced 
monetary penalties and up to five years in prison for 
broadcasting candidate-related advocacy during federal 
elections.5  Outlawing political speech based on the identity of the 
speaker appears to collide with the fundamental principles set 
forth in the First Amendment.  On January 10, 2010, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed this collision in Citizens United 
v. FEC.6 
In one of the most controversial decisions in decades, the 
Supreme Court, in Citizens United, invalidated the portions of 
the McCain-Feingold Act that dealt directly with corporate 
expenditures in support of political candidates.7  This decision set 
off an eruption of political debate and fierce partisanship.8  Some 
legal scholars and journalists called the decision “wrong-headed” 
and claimed the decision was made in “bad faith.”9  Still others 
characterized Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as “more like 
the rantings of a right-wing talk show host than the rational 
view of a justice with a sense of political realism.”10  The New 
York Times, in several editorials, blasted the Court and called 
the decision “disastrous,”11 “terrible,”12 and “reckless[ ].”13  In fact, 
the decision sparked so much controversy that President Obama 
“called out” the Court and specifically referred to Citizens United 
during his State of the Union Address in January 2010.14  
 
5 See § 312(a), § 315(a)–(b). 
6 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
7 Id. at 917. 
8 Discussing the President’s gratuitous remarks directed at the Supreme Court 
Justices and Justice Alito’s head-shaking response, legal experts have remarked 
that, “they had never seen anything quite like it, a rare and unvarnished showdown 
between two political branches during what is usually the careful choreography of 
the State of the Union address.” Robert Barnes, In the Court of Public Opinion, No 
Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2010, at A01. 
9 See Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77, 
78 (2010) (paraphrasing Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39). 
10 Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign 
Finance Reform, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2242209/pagenum/all. 
11 Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30. 
12 Editorial, After Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A20. 
13 Editorial, The Court and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A18. 
14 See, e.g., Editorial, Free Speech for Some, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2010, at A20; 
see also Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Liberal Courts May 
Have Overreached, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at A15; see also Address Before a 
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According to President Obama, “the Supreme Court reversed a 
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special 
interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit 
in our elections.  I don’t think American elections should be 
bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by 
foreign entities.”15  
The Court’s decision in Citizens United has unleashed a 
torrential wave of criticism from the media along with raising 
new questions and concerns from corporations who are unsure 
about how this decision impacts the rules governing the area of 
corporate expenditures, and it has left many companies afraid to 
run afoul of the law since there are criminal penalties at stake.16  
Even now, businesses are afraid to use their funds in support of 
candidates since they are unsure what, if anything, the Court 
invalidated and what restrictions remain in place when it comes 
to corporations expending their own funds in support of political 
parties and/or campaigns. 
In order to effectively analyze the impact of the Court’s 
holding in this controversial 5-4 decision, this article will discuss 
the following:  Part I will discuss the case law and regulatory 
history of campaign finance law in the United States over the 
past one-hundred years; Part II will look at the campaign finance 
law at issue in Citizens United—the McCain-Feingold Act—and 
some of its critical components; Part III will look at the 
background of the Citizens United case and the Court’s holding, 
along with some of its practical implications; Part IV will 
examine some lesser discussed aspects of the decision as well as 
the issues that have been misinterpreted by the media; and Part 
V will offer some conclusions. 
 
Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 55 (Jan. 27, 2010). 
15 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in State of 
the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. For the full text of President 
Obama’s speech, see Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of 
the Union, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 55 (Jan. 27, 2010). 
16 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 §§ 312(a), 
315(a)–(b), 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (2006 & Supp. II). 
WF_Vogel (Do Not Delete) 12/10/2012  5:01 PM 
186 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:183   
 
I. A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
Citizens United was not the first time that the issue of 
corporate involvement in federal campaigns was debated by 
litigants or addressed by Congress.17  Corporations and unions 
have long faced limits on direct contributions to political 
campaigns.18  The first restrictions on corporate involvement in 
the political process goes back more than a century19 and was 
enacted to limit what sponsors considered to be the corporate 
corrupting influence on the political marketplace.20 
The start of the twentieth century, often identified as the 
Gilded Age,21 is known as a period of enormous economic and 
industrial growth in America.  The largest and most influential 
businesses at the time were railroads, banks, and steel 
companies owned by the super-rich industrialists and financiers 
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W. 
Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Flagler, and J.P. Morgan.22  All 
of these men were attacked as “robber barons” by critics, who 
believed they cheated to get their money and that, because of 
their wealth, they were able to gain tremendous influence over 
politicians, Congress, and even the Presidency.23  
The concept of having Congress address the problem of 
corporate political influence all started with President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s State of the Union address after the 1904 Election.24  
 
17 See Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: 
Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 60–61 (1987) 
(describing the history of campaign finance regulation as a study in Congressional 
confusion). 
18 In February of 2010, while giving a speech at a Florida law school, Justice 
Clarence Thomas noted that Congressional regulation of the involvement of 
corporations in elections dates all the way back to 1907. See Adam Liptak, A Justice 
Responds to Criticism from Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17. 
19 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907). 
20 Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1128 (2002). 
21 Mike McCabe, It’s No Wonder Ordinary Folks Are Anxious, CAP TIMES (July 2, 
2010, 4:40 AM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_9a23dbc6-
3793-5255-b076-65f606688b79.html. 
22 See id. (quoting famed Cleveland industrialist Mark Hanna as having said, 
“There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can’t 
remember what the second one is.”). 
23 Id. 
24 40 CONG. REC. 91, 96 (1906) (statement of Charles G. Bennett, reading 
Theodore Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address).  
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Roosevelt was outspoken in his opposition to corporate influence 
on politics and suggested an outright ban on all contributions by 
corporations to avoid even the appearance of corruption or 
influence.25  Two years later, in 1907, Congress passed the 
Tillman Act, which prohibited corporations from making any 
contributions for the purposes of influencing a federal election’s 
outcome.26  While banning political contributions to candidates, 
the Tillman Act was silent on the issue of corporations expending 
their funds on their own in support of or against a candidate.27  
An independent expenditure is money spent by a corporation or 
union in support of a candidate in a manner uncoordinated with 
any political party or the candidate himself.28 
While direct contributions to candidates by corporations 
have been illegal since 1907, it was not until 1947 and the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress specifically 
prohibited independent expenditures made in support of a 
candidate by a corporation or labor union.29  Immediately after 
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, President Harry S. 
Truman questioned its constitutionality, particularly the 
independent contributions ban, when he vetoed the bill, stating 
that it was a “dangerous intrusion on free speech.”30  The bill 
eventually passed despite the President’s opposition, and it did 
not take long for the Supreme Court to comment on the validity 
of the statute’s new restrictions on corporate expenditures.31  In 
1948, in United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
the Court did not specifically address the constitutionality of the 
independent expenditure ban32; however, the majority did 
 
25 See id. In his 1905 message to Congress, Roosevelt wrote, “All contributions 
by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be 
forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for 
such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it went, 
an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.” Id. 
26 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907). 
27 See id.  
28 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)(B) (2006). Expenditures are: “(i) any purchase, payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by 
any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; and (ii) a 
written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure.” Id. § (9)(A). 
29 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
30 Veto of the Taft-Hartley Labor Bill, PUB. PAPERS 288, 296 (June 20, 1947). 
31 See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 107 (1948). 
32 Id. at 110. 
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remark that it had “the gravest doubt” about the 
constitutionality of the prohibition.33  Almost a decade later, in 
United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft 
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, the Court would 
take a closer look at the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley 
Act’s corporate expenditure ban.34  Here, even though the court 
held that the expenditure ban, as applied to the specific facts of 
the case, appropriately prohibited a union television broadcast 
that specifically advocated for congressional candidates, the 
Court never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of the 
statute as a whole.35  Again, in dissent, three justices argued that 
the Court should have addressed the constitutional question and, 
had it done so, they would have found the ban on independent 
expenditures unconstitutional.36  Justice Douglas, in his dissent 
in the Automobile Workers case stated that: 
Some may think that one group or another should not express 
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it 
advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless 
action.  But these are not justifications for withholding First 
Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate.  First 
Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all persons and 
groups in this country.  They are not to be dispensed or 
withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks the person 
or group is worthy or unworthy.37 
Over the next two decades, the constitutionality of the ban on 
expenditures would get bantered about or commented upon in 
dicta, but it would never be fully addressed by the courts.38 
 
 
33 Id. at 121. In this case, the Court did not look at the constitutionality of the 
statute as a whole because it held that the statute did not apply to the particular 
publication at issue—a labor union weekly periodical that endorsed a congressional 
candidate. Id. at 110. 
34 See 352 U.S. 567, 568 (1957).  
35 See id. at 591. 
36 See id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the ban on 
expenditures based on the belief that corporations and unions were “too powerful” 
was not sufficient grounds for denying “First Amendment rights from any group.” Id. 
at 597. 
37 Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
38 See, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399–
400 (1972) (failing to address the constitutionality of the ban while simultaneously 
reversing a conviction for the expenditure of union funds for political speech). 
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After the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s, Congress 
took another look at the myriad of issues surrounding the federal 
campaign finance system and attempted to resolve those issues 
with the passage of several amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).39  FECA, originally passed in 
1971, along with its 1974 Amendments, is essentially the 
foundation upon which the most recent campaign finance laws 
were built.40  FECA, among other things, established new 
contribution limits for individuals, political parties, and political 
action committees (“PACs”) and established filing requirements 
for both contributions and expenditures.41  While controversial,42 
the 1974 Amendments to FECA were Congress’s attempt to 
restore the public’s confidence in the integrity of the electoral 
system and to remedy the loopholes and problems that were 
identified after the Watergate scandal.43  Essentially, FECA 
imposed three different restrictions on corporations’ and labor 
unions’ efforts to influence elections.44  They imposed 
contribution limitations and banned independent expenditures,45 
they imposed fundraising restrictions, and they limited the 
contributions to political committees and PACs.46  They also 
imposed disclosure requirements on PACs for contributions 
based on the amount contributed, the nature of the contributor, 
and the contribution’s proximity to an election.47  
 
39 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123, 1124 (2002). 
40 Kevin J. Madden, Comment, Turning the Faucet Back On: The Future of 
McCain-Feingold’s Soft-Money Ban After Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 385, 391 (2009) (discussing the history of modern campaign finance 
law). 
41 See id. at 391–93; see also, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (repealed 1976). 
42 See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM AND THE COURTS 49 (2005). 
43 See Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Financing in Federal Elections: A Guide to 
the Law and its Operation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES 
AND LAWS 55, 63 (Auguste V. Anschutz ed. 2002). 
44 § 101, 88 Stat. at 1263–64.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. § 204. 
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A. Buckley v. Valeo 
Shortly after FECA was amended, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of the new statutory limitations on 
campaign contributions and expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo.48  
In Buckley, the Court was asked to address three major issues: 
the constitutionality of the limits on direct contributions to 
candidates, the constitutionality of the independent expenditure 
ban, and the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements.49  
When the Court examined the provision limiting the amount an 
individual may expend in support or defeat of a particular 
candidate, it held that “the governmental interest in preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to 
justify [the statute’s] ceiling on independent expenditures.”50  The 
Court remarked, “the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”51  Based upon this First Amendment analysis, the 
Court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the limitation 
on independent expenditures was unconstitutional.52  The Court 
pointed out that “the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to 
serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the 
reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”53  
Oddly, even though the Court invalidated the independent 
expenditure limitation provision for individuals, it did not 
consider the constitutionality of the separate ban on corporate 
and union independent expenditures.54 
 
48 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (consolidating a number of cases brought by various 
challengers to the FECA Amendments). 
49 See id. at 13–14 (stating that the critical constitutional questions presented 
are whether the specific legislative bans on contributions and expenditures interfere 
with First Amendment freedoms or violates the Fifth Amendment because it 
discriminates against non-incumbent candidates’ and minor parties’ ability to raise 
funds). 
50 Id. at 45. 
51 Id. at 48–49 (stating that the First Amendment was designed “ ‘to secure the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,’ 
and ‘to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’ ” (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 266 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
52 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51. 
53 Id. at 47–48. 
54 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010). 
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B. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
Less than two years after Buckley, the Court struck down a 
state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures 
related to referenda issues in the case of First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti.55  In Bellotti, two national banking associations 
and three business corporations wanted to spend money to 
publicize their position on a proposed state constitutional 
amendment that would have permitted the legislature to impose 
a graduated individual income tax.56  The statute at issue 
prohibited the corporations from making contributions or 
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the 
vote on any question submitted to the voters.”57  Any corporation 
or corporate officer, director, or agent who violated the statute 
could be subject to a monetary fine and up to a year of 
imprisonment.58  The Supreme Court rejected the state statute’s 
prohibition of corporate expenditures related to issue advocacy on 
the principle that the legislature does not have the power to ban 
corporations from speaking on political issues.59  While the 
Bellotti decision did not address the constitutionality of the 
State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures in support of 
individual candidates, the Supreme Court has offered that had it 
analyzed the issue, the Court would have invalidated the ban on 
the premise that the First Amendment does not permit 
restrictions on political speech merely because the speaker is a 
corporation.60 
C. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
It was not until 1990, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,61 that the Court finally addressed the issue of 
corporate independent expenditures head-on.  In Austin, the 
 
55 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). 
56 Id. at 768–69. 
57 Id. at 768 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). 
58 Id. at 768. 
59 See id. at 784–85 (“We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment or in 
the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be 
within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because 
its source is a corporation . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
60 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010). 
61 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010). 
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Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use its general 
treasury funds to run an advertisement in a local newspaper in 
support of a candidate who was attempting to fill a vacancy in 
the Michigan House of Representatives.62  However, under 
Section 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 
corporations were prohibited “from making contributions and 
independent expenditures in connection with state candidate 
elections.”63  Worse yet, any violation of the prohibition on 
corporate independent expenditures was punishable as a felony.64  
The Chamber of Commerce initiated an action seeking injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the Act, claiming the prohibition on 
corporate independent expenditures was unconstitutional and 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.65 
While the Buckley and Bellotti cases were not controlling—
because neither case directly addressed the constitutionality of 
prohibiting corporate independent expenditures in support of a 
candidate—the Austin Court circumvented the traditional First 
Amendment analysis utilized in those cases and identified a new 
governmental interest in limiting political speech: an anti-
distortion interest.66  The Court posited that the Michigan 
statute at issue was “aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in 
the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form . . . .”67  The Court held that corporate 
wealth could unfairly influence elections when it is used in the 
form of independent expenditures and, as such, the State had a 
“sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction.”68 
Before Austin, the Supreme Court had never held that 
Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political 
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.69  Thus, the 
Court’s decision in Austin was at odds with the longstanding 
 
62 Id. at 656. 
63 Id. at 655 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)). 
64 Id. at 656 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(5) (1979)). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 659–60. The court stated that it was upholding the restriction on 
independent expenditures by corporations, regardless of “whether [the] danger of 
‘financial quid pro quo’ corruption . . . may be sufficient” to warrant such a ban, 
because corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections. Id.  
67 Id. at 660. 
68 Id. 
69 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010). 
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position that believing a particular group is “too powerful” is not 
a basis upon which to deny or withhold First Amendment rights, 
even if that group is corporate or labor union in form.70  Austin 
was a notable diversion from the Court’s recognition that First 
Amendment rights and protections extend to everyone, even 
corporations.71  Shortly after Austin, Congress took advantage of 
the judicial support for banning corporate and union independent 
expenditures and enacted the McCain-Feingold Act.  
D. McConnell v. FEC and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
Immediately after the McCain-Feingold Act was enacted, it 
faced its first challenge in the courts in McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission.72  In McConnell, multiple plaintiffs 
asserted that section 203 of the McCain-Feingold Act was an 
unconstitutional restriction on free speech because the statute’s 
prohibition of “electioneering communications” was applied to 
more than just express advocacy.73  The Court rejected this 
argument and held that section 203 was facially constitutional 
because the rationale for regulating corporate independent 
expenditures that were express advocacy could also be applied to 
ads that are “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”74  
The Court based its holding in McConnell on the presumption 
that these types of expenditures could have the same kind of 
“corrosive and distorting effects” on the electorate as the 
expenditures specifically prohibited under Austin, and extending 
that restriction would serve the government’s compelling interest 
in countering those effects.75  Even though the Supreme Court 
did not elaborate on the definition of “functional equivalent,” they 
based their opinion on the district court’s determination that the 
 
70 Id. at 901 (citing United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 597 (1957)). 
71 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (citing 
eleven prior Supreme Court decisions which held state laws invalid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment when the laws infringed on protected speech by corporate 
bodies); see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). This 
protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. 
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). 
72 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010).  
73 See id. at 205–06. 
74 Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 205. 
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McCain-Feingold Act targeted only broadcast ads because those 
ads are the most effective form of communicating an 
electioneering message and therefore posed the greatest risk of 
corruption.76  
Even though the Court declared section 203 to be facially 
constitutional with regard to the McConnell ads, it opened the 
door to future “as-applied” challenges and remarked that such 
challenges could be successful on a case-by-case basis.77  The first 
successful as-applied challenge came four years later in Federal 
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.78  Wisconsin 
Right to Life (“WRTL”), a non-profit corporation, wished to use 
its general treasury funds to pay for television advertisements on 
the issue of the US Senate filibuster of Bush administration 
judicial nominees.79  The ads were to be broadcast during the 
period prohibited by the McCain-Feingold Act80—the period 
immediately preceding the re-election of Wisconsin Senator Russ 
Feingold.  WRTL admitted that some of the funds to be used for 
the ads had come from corporate donors.81 
The Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion in 
WRTL.  Rather, the Court splintered into three lines of 
reasoning.  The opinion that is considered the lead opinion, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justice Alito, 
provided that the determination in McConnell—that section 203 
could constitutionally prohibit ads that were the “functional 
equivalent” of express advocacy—was still valid.82  However, 
Justice Roberts elaborated on that interpretation by stating that 
“a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable 
 
76 See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71 (D.D.C. 2003). The 
district court noted that forms of media that required viewers to “opt-in” or “make a 
choice to . . . watch the program” would mostly reach voters already predisposed to 
those views and would reach far fewer undecided voters than a broadcast ad. See id. 
at 571, 646. For the McConnell district court, this was a “critical distinction” that 
separated communications that posed a great risk of corruption—broadcast ads—
from those that did not—viewer choice media. Id. at 571. 
77 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 460 (2007) (noting that the 
holding in McConnell left the door open for future “as applied” challenges to the 
constitutionality of section 203). 
78 551 U.S. 449 (2007).  
79 Id. at 458–59. 
80 See id. at 460. 
81 See id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 465 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
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interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.”83  When this new test was applied to the ads 
to be broadcast by WRTL, the Court found that they were not the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy because they took a 
position on a legislative issue and urged the public to contact 
their representatives, rather than specifically advocating for or 
against a candidate.84  Importantly, the ads did not “mention an 
election, candidacy, political party, or challenger” or “take a 
position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness for 
office.”85  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with 
the functional equivalency test utilized by Justice Roberts, but 
concurred with Roberts’ determination that section 203 was 
unconstitutional as applied to WRTL’s ads.86  As a result of their 
concurrence, Justice Roberts’ test was identified as the holding in 
the case.87  Shortly after the WRTL case was decided, the FEC 
promulgated federal regulations to codify Justice Roberts’ 
rationale.88 
As a result of the Court’s holdings in Austin, McConnell, and 
WRTL, when the Court was asked to evaluate the validity of a 
statutory restriction on corporate speech in Citizens United, it 
was faced with two separate but conflicting lines of precedent: 
the pre-Austin line that repeatedly struck down restrictions on 
free speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-
Austin line that said it would be acceptable to limit the speech of 
corporations and unions in certain circumstances.  Before looking  
 
 
 
83 Id. at 469–70 (reasoning that this must be an objective test that focuses on the 
substance of the advertisement and not on “amorphous considerations of intent and 
effect,” or other contextual factors that might illustrate the corporation’s reasons for 
running the ad).  
84 Id. at 476; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889–90 (2010). 
85 Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 470. 
86 Id. at 493, 504 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
87 See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008). The 
parties in the Citizens United case agreed in the district court that Justice Roberts’s 
rationale was the “governing test for the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 
Id. This gave authoritative weight to Justice Roberts’s test based on the principle 
that “ ‘[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’ ” Id. (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
88 See 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2007). 
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at how the Court resolved this dilemma, it is important to review 
the specific sections of the McCain-Feingold Act that were at 
issue. 
II. THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT 
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act,89 otherwise known as the McCain-Feingold Act.  The 
McCain-Feingold Act was one of the most far-reaching overhauls 
of campaign finance law since the 1970s and, in broad terms, 
banned unlimited corporate donations to national political party 
committees, put limitations on advertising by organizations not 
affiliated with parties, and banned the use of corporate and 
union money for “electioneering communication[s]”—ads that 
name a federal candidate—within thirty days of a primary 
election or sixty days of a general election.90  The sponsor of the 
bill, John McCain, stated that the McCain-Feingold Act,  
[S]eeks to reform the way we finance campaigns for federal 
office in three major ways. First, BCRA prohibits the national 
political parties from raising or spending “soft money” (large 
contributions, often from corporations or labor unions, not 
permitted in federal elections), and it generally bans state 
parties from using soft money to finance federal election 
campaign activity. Second, it increases the hard money 
contribution limits set by the 1974 amendments to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Finally, the new law prohibits 
corporations and unions from using soft money to finance 
broadcast campaign ads close to federal elections (though 
corporations and unions can finance these ads with hard money 
through their political action committees), and it requires 
individuals and unincorporated groups to disclose their 
spending on these ads. The law represents the most 
comprehensive congressional reform of our federal campaign 
finance system since FECA was enacted and amended in the 
1970s.91 
 
 
89 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81. 
90 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). 
91 John McCain, Introduction: Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1017 (2002). 
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By passing the McCain-Feingold Act, Congress was hoping to 
stop the unregulated flow of soft money and return the world of 
campaign finance regulation to its pre-Watergate position where 
there were defined prohibitions and limits on contributions to 
political parties.92  The McCain-Feingold Act was the end result 
of “a protracted six-year legislative and political struggle”; 
however, as President Bush was signing the bill into law, the 
first wave of more than a dozen lawsuits challenging its 
constitutionality was already crashing upon the Supreme Court’s 
shores.93  Since the McCain-Feingold Act’s enactment, the 
Supreme Court has heard several cases addressing various 
campaign finance issues regulated therein, but none of these 
cases has been as controversial or had such a significant impact 
on campaign finance law as Citizens United.  
The specific McCain-Feingold Act provisions at issue in 
Citizens United were sections 201, 203 and 311,94 all of which 
served as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (“FECA”).95  Section 203 of the McCain-Feingold Act 
regulates using corporate funds for “electioneering 
communication[s].”96  In general, an electioneering 
communication was identified as a “broadcast, cable, or satellite” 
communication made within sixty days of a general election or 
thirty days of a primary election.97  Section 203 continues by 
restricting corporations and labor unions from funding 
electioneering communications from their general funds except 
under certain specific circumstances, such as get-out-the-vote 
campaigns.98  Even though certain types of “electioneering 
communications” are permissible, they are subject to the 
McCain-Feingold Act’s disclosure and disclaimer requirements 
that are delineated under sections 201 and 311.  
 
92 See Madden, supra note 39, at 387; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1). 
93 Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1180–81 (2002) 
(noting that not only did the new act face constitutional challenges, but it also was 
under attack and being marginalized by rules adopted by the FEC that could 
ultimately lead to further lawsuits). 
94 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
155, §§ 201, 203, 311, 116 Stat. 81, 88–89, 91–92, 105–06 (2002). 
95 McCain-Feingold Act § 101.  
96 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. I).  
97 Id. 
98 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006). 
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Section 201 of the McCain-Feingold Act contains a donor 
disclosure provision for electioneering communications.99  
Persons who disburse an aggregate of $10,000 or more a year for 
the production and airing of electioneering communications are 
required to file a statement with the Federal Election 
Commission (“FEC”).100  The statement must include the names 
and addresses of persons who have contributed in excess of 
$1,000 to accounts funding the communication.101 
The McCain-Feingold Act’s section 311 contains a disclaimer 
provision for electioneering communications.102  If the candidate 
or the candidate’s political committee did not authorize the 
electioneering communication at issue, then the organization 
responsible for the communication must disclose that the 
organization “is responsible for the content of this advertising.”103  
III. CITIZENS UNITED & HILLARY: THE MOVIE 
Citizens United is a non-profit corporation with an annual 
budget of about $12 million.104  The corporation acquires the 
majority of these funds via donations from individuals; however, 
it receives donations from for-profit corporations as well.105  In 
January 2008, Citizens United released a ninety-minute 
documentary examining the record, policies, and character of 
then-Presidential Democratic primary candidate Hillary 
Clinton.106  The documentary, called Hillary: The Movie, 
“examine[d] Hillary Clinton’s political background in a critical 
light,”107 and mainly focused on  
five aspects of Hillary’s political career: firing of certain White 
House staff during her husband’s presidency, retaliation against 
a woman who accused her husband of sexual harassment,  
 
 
 
99 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. I). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006). 
103 Id. § 441d(d)(2). 
104 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886–87 (2010). 
105 Id. at 887. 
106 Id. 
107 Aaron Harmon, Comment, Hillary: The Movie: Corporate Free Speech or 
Campaign Finance Corruption?, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 331, 333 
(2009). 
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violations of finance restrictions during her Senate campaign, 
her husband’s abuse of the presidential pardon power, and her 
record on various political issues.108   
The film was to be released in theaters and on DVD; however, 
Citizens United desired a broader distribution and arranged to 
have the movie broadcast on cable through video-on-demand.109  
Since the documentary was to be broadcast during Clinton’s 
presidential primary campaign, Citizens United was aware that 
its movie and advertising might be considered electioneering 
communications and would be subject to the McCain-Feingold 
Act’s sections 201, 203 and 311.110  As a preemptive strike, 
Citizens United sought an injunction to block the FEC from 
enforcing those sections on the grounds that they violated the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.111  To Citizens 
United’s disappointment, the broadcast was banned when the 
FEC declared that the broadcast would violate various provisions 
of the McCain-Feingold Act.112  Since the McCain-Feingold Act’s 
drafters anticipated the likelihood of lawsuits questioning its 
validity,113 it contains a provision that specifically addresses 
constitutional challenges to its various prohibitions.114  This 
provision requires that these claims be brought before a three-
judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.115  Appeals from this court go directly to the United 
States Supreme Court.116  As a result of these jurisdictional 
restrictions, Citizens United went to the District Court for 
injunctive relief but its application was denied.117  Citizens 
United immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 
108 Id. 
109 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
110 See id. at 888. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. 
113 See McCain, supra note 90, at 1018 (noting that “[f]ortunately, the law 
ultimately provides for expedited review in the Supreme Court”). 
114 Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14. 
115 Id. § 403(a)(1).  
116 Id. § 403(a)(3). 
117 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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A. The Supreme Court Elects To Examine the McCain-Feingold 
Act on Its Face 
When analyzing the numerous arguments presented in 
Citizens United, the Court determined that “[i]n the exercise of 
its judicial responsibility,” it needed to examine the validity of 
the McCain-Feingold Act on its face and not on the narrower 
grounds suggested by the litigants and the holdings of earlier 
decisions, because deciding the case on such narrower grounds 
would lead to further litigation and, in the interim, political 
speech would be chilled.118  The Court rejected Citizens United’s 
as-applied challenges based on the finding that the documentary, 
Hillary: The Movie, was the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy because it was essentially a “feature-length negative 
advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton 
for President.”119  The Court further rejected the contention that 
it should create an as-applied exception for videos on-demand 
because to do so would require it to redraw constitutional lines 
for different types of media,120 which could have the unintended 
result of chilling political speech.121   
The Court correctly noted that if it applied the test 
established in Austin—the anti-distortion test—instead of 
examining the statute on its face, it could “produce the 
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence” of banning political 
speech emanating from media corporations.122  While noting that 
media corporations were technically exempt from the corporate 
expenditure ban set forth in section 441b,123 the Court observed 
that media corporations also accumulate immense wealth with 
the help of the corporate form and that “the views expressed by 
 
118 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 894 (2010). 
119 Id. at 890. 
120 See id. at 890–91. The Court also reasoned that an as-applied analysis would 
result in other types of media running to the courts to determine if § 441b’s 
restrictions applied to their activities and would “chill[ ] political speech” until such 
determinations would be made. See id. at 891. The Court also elected not to extend 
the holding in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) 
(“MCFL”), which exempted non-profit corporations that receive minimal funding 
from for-profit corporations, because it would require the Court to sever a portion of 
the BCRA and it would result in future case-by-case determinations. See id. at 891–
92. 
121 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892. 
122 See id. at 905. 
123 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. I). 
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media corporations often ‘have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support’ for those views.”124  As the Court went on to 
observe, the “line between the media and others who wish to 
comment on political and social issues [has become] far more 
blurred” with the “advent of the Internet,” blogs, and cable 
television, and the decline of traditional print and broadcast 
media.125  Within the context of this dilemma, the Court 
recognized that making distinctions between media corporations 
and non-media corporations would be difficult at best.126  
Analyzing the statute on a case-by-case basis could have the 
unfortunate result of exempting a corporation that owns both 
media and non-media businesses, while simultaneously, a wholly  
non-media corporation could be forbidden to speak even though it 
may have the same interests.127  Such a result “cannot be squared 
with the First Amendment.” 128 
Last, after the Court examined the morass of existing 
legislation, FEC advisory opinions, explanations and 
justifications, and FEC regulations governing the universe of 
campaign finance, it concluded that the existing complicated 
regulatory scheme acted as a prior restraint on speech in the 
harshest of terms.129  As such, the Court determined that the 
proper adjudication required it to finally consider the facial 
validity of section 441b of the McCain-Feingold Act, and whether 
courts should continue to adhere to Austin and the relevant 
portion of McConnell.130 
B. Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment Analysis 
The First Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”131  It is undisputable 
that free speech is an “essential mechanism of democracy” 
 
124 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
125 See id. at 905–06. 
126 See id. at 906. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 895–96 (pointing out that there are unique and complex campaign 
finance rules for 71 distinct entities, subject to 33 different types of political speech, 
with 568 pages of FEC regulations and 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications 
for the regulations, followed by 1,771 advisory opinions). 
130 Id. at 891–94.  
131 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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because one of its many benefits is that it affords citizens the 
opportunity to hold their elected officials accountable.132  As such, 
the “First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application 
to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.’ ”133  The 
Supreme Court has already recognized that the “[d]iscussion of 
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are 
integral to the operation of the system of government established 
by our Constitution.”134  Thus, in this context, if the First  
Amendment is to mean anything, it must mean that the 
government is not permitted to fine or imprison citizens or 
associations of citizens merely for engaging in political speech.135 
Recognizing the above to be true, it is a natural progression 
to hold that political speech must be protected from laws that are 
designed to either intentionally suppress it, or do so 
inadvertently.136  For it is political speech, emanating from 
diverse sources, that provides the voters with some of the 
information necessary to decide which candidates to support.137  
Every first-year law student learns that laws that burden speech, 
even political speech, will be subject to “strict scrutiny” review by 
the Court.138  In order to successfully make it past this review, 
the government will be required to demonstrate that the law 
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored” to 
promote that interest.139  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
recognized that on rare occasions it has upheld a “narrow class of 
speech restrictions” that do infringe on a speaker’s First 
Amendment rights; however, in all these cases, the Court found a 
compelling governmental interest.140   
 
132 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–
15 (1976). 
133 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
135 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
136 Id. at 898. 
137 Id. at 899. 
138 Id. at 898. 
139FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). 
140 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)) (“protecting the ‘function of public school education’ ”); see 
also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering 
“the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”); Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its 
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The Court did not find a compelling interest in Citizens 
United.141  Justice Kennedy observed that the Court has a long 
history of holding that corporations are entitled to the rights 
recognized under the First Amendment.142  These rights include 
political speech.143  First Amendment protections do not vanish 
merely because the speaker is a corporation.  As the Court 
correctly recognized, “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity 
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control 
content.”144  The Court went on to note that “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”145  Here, the Court recognized 
that the FEC set in place a complicated process whereby it, and it 
alone, would select what political speech is safe for dissemination 
to the public, and in so deciding, it employed a series of 
subjective and ambiguous tests.146  Such a scheme would act as a 
prior restraint and an unprecedented governmental intrusion on 
the right to speak, the likes of which could not be sustained.147  
As the Court noted, “[b]y taking the right to speak from some 
and giving it to others, the Government deprives the 
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive 
to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s 
voice.”148  The Court went on to say, “[t]he Government may not 
by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to 
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of 
consideration.”149  Moreover, the Court recognized that upholding 
the statute and allowing the government to ban corporations 
from engaging in political speech could result in suppression of 
speech in other media such as books,150 blogs, or social 
 
[military] responsibilities”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers 
AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should depend upon 
meritorious performance rather than political service.”). 
141 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
142 Id. at 899–900. 
143 Id. at 900. 
144 Id. at 899. 
145 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) 
146 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. 
147 Id. at 895–96. 
148 Id. at 899. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 904. 
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networking websites.151  The government’s interest in leveling the 
political-influence playing field between individuals and 
corporations was unconvincing when one considers that a “mere 
24 individuals contributed an astounding total of $142 million” 
during the 2004 election.152  Simultaneously, other like-minded 
citizens who have organized under the corporate form were 
prohibited from having their voices heard.  The Court rightly 
concluded that the First Amendment is part of the foundation for  
the freedom to exchange ideas, and the public must be able to use 
all kinds of forums to share those ideas without fear of 
governmental reprisal.153 
IV. WHAT DOES THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE LOOK LIKE POST-CITIZENS UNITED? 
As mentioned at the outset of this article, Citizens United 
caused an eruption of criticism about the holding’s impact on the 
world of campaign finance and the potential corruptive influence 
of corporations and unions on the political process.154  Critics of 
the decision should take some comfort in the reality that Citizens 
United will likely have less of a negative impact, if at all, than 
originally feared. 
First, while some early supporters of the McCain-Feingold 
Act touted that its provisions barred corporations and unions 
from funding political ads,155 in reality, the McCain-Feingold Act 
merely required that corporations and unions finance the ads 
through their PAC’s or similar voluntarily financed segregated 
funds.156  PAC’s were exempted under the McCain-Feingold Act 
 
151 Id. at 913. 
152 Id. at 908 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 503–04 
(2007)). 
153 Id. at 917. 
154 See supra notes 8–13. 
155 See, e.g., George Will, Political Ads a Freedom of Speech, TIMES UNION 
(Albany), Dec. 21, 2002, at B5. 
156 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-155 § 203(a), 116 Stat. 81, 91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)) 
(prohibiting corporations and unions from financing electioneering communications 
outside of PACs); § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88–90 (defining “electioneering 
communication”); see also Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant 
Constitutional Issues, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123, 1131 (2002) (noting that corporations 
and unions could still run campaign ads as long as they were funded by voluntary 
contributions from employees, shareholders, or union members instead of using the 
corporation’s general funds). 
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and, even though they were complicated to create and manage, 
they did afford corporations a forum to participate in the political 
process.157  So, as long as corporations and unions collected 
campaign funds from their members with each member’s 
informed consent, these entities could continue to influence 
elections and some experts even expected the number of ads to 
increase after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act.158  
Moreover, even though corporations and unions are no longer 
prohibited from engaging in independent expenditures in support 
of or against political candidates, their participation in elections 
remains highly regulated.  For example, direct contributions by 
corporations and unions are still prohibited under federal law 
and under the laws of twenty-four states.159  A corporation or 
union still cannot donate corporate money directly to, or 
coordinate their political spending with, candidates for political 
office.160  The laws requiring specific notices or disclaimers on 
political advertising remain untouched by Citizens United.161  
There is still a myriad of disclosure laws governing independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications on the part of 
corporations and unions.162  Thus, even if a corporation or union 
were to independently expend funds in support of a candidate, 
money that is donated to the corporation for the purpose of 
financing said expenditures would be subject to the disclosure 
 
157 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (acknowledging that PACs were a separate 
association from the corporation but pointing out that they were “burdensome 
alternatives” that were expensive to operate and were still subject to extensive 
regulation). 
158 See New Campaign Finance Law Expected to Enhance Role, Challenges of 
PACs New Contribution Limits Provisions Affecting PACs, 70 U.S.L.W. 2684 (2002) 
(discussing how corporate and union attempts at electoral influence will not be 
stopped by the BCRA but merely re-routed through their PACs); see generally, 
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (recognizing the inevitable flow of political 
money to channels that remain open after regulation). 
159 Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) (noting 
that “[o]ne state bans political activity by unions, nine ban corporate political 
activity, and 14 ban political activity by both corporations and unions”). 
160 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (noting that Court did not overrule the 
ban on contributions). 
161 Jan Baran, Citizens United v. FEC: Independent Political Advertising by 
Corporations, 2010 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 4875 (February 22, 2010). 
162 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17. 
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laws.163  And last, despite President Obama’s declaration that 
foreign entities will now have greater influence on American 
elections, foreign corporations and their subsidiaries are still 
subject to the existing spending bans.164 
 
What has not been widely discussed is that Citizens United 
has spawned a new wave of litigation concerning several other 
aspects of the McCain-Feingold Act.  For example, two federal 
courts issued campaign finance law decisions in the spring of 
2010 that can trace their origins back to Citizens United.  In 
SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia was asked to weigh in on the 
constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold Act’s contribution 
limitations and disclosure requirements as applied to 
contributions to a PAC.165  The court held that, since the 
expenditures themselves do not corrupt, it should follow that 
contributions to groups that plan only to make those 
expenditures will not lead to corruption either.166  But this 
unfettered right to donate to a group like SpeechNow does not 
extend to the right to donate to an actual political party.  As 
such, “[u]nder current law, outside groups—unlike candidates 
and political parties—may receive unlimited donations both to 
advocate in favor of federal candidates and to sponsor issue 
ads.”167  This particular dilemma was raised in the second 
caseRepublican National Committee v. FEC.168  In the 
Republican National Committee case, the RNC challenged the 
McCain-Feingold Act’s soft-money ban claiming that it had the 
right to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money on all kinds 
 
163 See id. (finding no constitutional impediment to the application of the 
disclosure laws set forth in the BCRA). 
164 See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006) (providing that foreign nationals are banned 
from contributing to or expending funds in support of political candidates or parties); 
see also Randy E. Barnett, Obama Owes the High Court an Apology, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 29, 2010, at A13. 
165 SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 690–91 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 
sub nom. Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
166 See id. at 694; see also Adam Liptak, On Campaign Finance, Rulings for 
Advocacy Groups and Against Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at A13.  
167 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 160 n.5 (D.D.C. 2010), 
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
168 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010).  
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of election-related issues169 and that the ban discriminates 
against the national political parties.170  The court held that 
plaintiffs’ claims were at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding 
in McConnell and that the Court’s recent decision in Citizens 
United did not disturb the part of McConnell’s holding that 
addressed the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold Act’s 
limits on contributions to political parties.171  
There are also several new issues that have been raised as a 
result of the holding in Citizens United.  When President Obama 
“dressed down” the Supreme Court in his State of the Union 
address in 2009, he, along with other critics, conveniently failed 
to mention the group that benefitted the most from the 
decisionlabor unions.172  Skeptics could argue that this is 
because nine out of ten dollars spent on elections by unions goes 
to the DemocratsObama’s party.173  It is interesting that the 
majority of the criticism of Citizens United comes from the 
political left, and while they lament the decision’s impact as it 
relates to corporations, those same critics often fail to mention 
the impact on union participation in the electoral process.  
Unions admittedly spent approximately one-half billion dollars in 
the 2008 election, a figure that dwarfs the spending of 
corporations.174   
 
169 See id. at 15455. The RNC claimed it wanted to  
raise and spend unlimited soft money in order to (1) support state 
candidates in elections where only state candidates appear on the ballot; 
(2) support state candidates in elections where both state and federal 
candidates appear on the ballot; (3) support state parties’ redistricting 
efforts following the 2010 census; (4) support “grassroots lobbying efforts” 
aimed at educating and mobilizing voters around “legislation and issues”; 
(5) pay the fees and expenses attributable to this case and “other litigation 
not involving federal elections”; and (6) pay maintenance and upkeep 
expenses associated with the RNC’s headquarters. 
Id. 
170 See id. at 160 n.5. 
171 See id. at 153 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910–11 (2010)). 
172 Steven J. Law, Organized Labor and Citizens United, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 
2010, at A15 (noting that labor unions spent approximately half-a-billion dollars in 
the 2008 election, significantly more than any group representing business). 
173 See id. 
174 See id. (noting that while public companies have to deal with the pursuit of 
profits and the desires of shareholders, unions have very little holding them back 
from engaging in political action). 
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In addition, while critics of the decision claim the majority 
“piously claim it’s about ‘free speech’,”175 they have sat silent, or 
in some cases applauded, as the Supreme Court relies on First 
Amendment jurisprudence in cases about Internet 
pornography,176 flag burning,177 topless dancing,178 cross-
burning,179 and even creating, selling, or possessing films 
depicting animal torture for purposes of sexual arousal.180  To 
hold that such conduct described in these cases is worthy of 
constitutional protection, yet simultaneously support the idea 
that a corporation that expends its funds in support of a political 
candidate should be exposed to criminal liability seems 
irreconcilable.  Last, while political pundits and scholars have 
criticized the ability of corporations to use their vast wealth to 
allegedly influence elections, they rarely express the same 
concern for the sudden rise of wealthy individuals who are using 
their own millions to either buy an elected position for 
themselves or use it to influence the outcome of others.181  Recent 
political candidates like Mayor Michael Bloomberg in New York, 
California Gubernatorial candidates Arnold Schwarzenegger and 
Meg Whitman, New Jersey Governor John Corzine, the Kennedy 
and Bush families, Connecticut Senate candidate Linda 
McMahon and Florida Senate candidate Jeff Greene, and 
billionaires George Soros and Rupert Murdoch, just to name a 
few, have all used their own immense financial resources in an 
effort to influence the electorate. 
While many critics focus on corporations making sizable 
expenditures on behalf of a candidate, they lose focus of the 
reality that the public’s participation in the political process has 
changed with the advent of the Internet.  For example, given the 
success of Internet fundraising in the 2008 presidential election, 
 
175 E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Corporate States of America?, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 
2010, at A17. 
176 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661, 666, 670 (2004); (invalidating the Child 
Online Protection Act (COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231(2006))). 
177 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–18 (1989). 
178 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972). 
179 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–63 (2003). 
180 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–93 (2010); see also Bradley A. 
Smith, Newsflash: First Amendment Upheld, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2010, at A15.  
181 Charles Krauthammer, The U.S. House of Lords?, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 
2008, at A35. 
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it is likely that in future elections, aggregations of smaller 
individual donations will actually outweigh the spending of 
corporations.182  In his 2008 Presidential campaign, Barack 
Obama raised close to a half-a-billion dollars via Internet 
donations to his campaign.183  Of the 6.5 million donations 
received by Obama, six million were for $100 or less, with the 
average on-line donation being $80.184  According to the Federal 
Election Commission, the total sum of individual donations of 
$200 or less to all political candidates in the 2008 election 
exceeded that of contributions from individual donors who gave 
more than $2000.185  In fact, to simplify and hopefully enhance 
this trend, some experts have suggested new ways for individual 
citizens to contribute to campaigns by way of a tax credit.186  The 
proposal provides that each American should be allowed a 
limited federal tax credit that could only be applied if the money 
is donated to a federal candidate during election years.187  It is 
further posited that, if the tax credit could be collected 
electronically in the form of a credit card, debit card, or directly 
from a bank account, the simplicity would increase participation 
and could result in candidates paying more attention to 
mainstream issues.188 
CONCLUSION 
Citizens United, while controversial, marks the end of more 
than twenty years of erosion of the First Amendment rights of 
corporations and unions, particularly on the issue of political 
 
182 See Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 332 (2010). 
183 See Jose Antonio Vargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 20, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/obama-raised-
half-a-billion-on.html. 
184 See id. 
185 2008 Presidential Campaign Finance: Contributions to All Candidates, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do;jsessionid=0BE 
511403BC45C1D69984A1F7679DC31.worker1 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (reporting 
that the total sum of donations of $200 and under was $427,817,410 while the sum 
of the donations of $2000 or greater was $418,956,583). 
186 Bruce Ackerman & David Wu, How To Counter Corporate Speech, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 27, 2010, at A13 (proposing that if each citizen had the chance to contribute 
“democracy dollars” in the form of a tax credit, that the aggregation of donations 
would likely dwarf the sums spent by corporations).  
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
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speech.  As Justice Kennedy stated, one of the hallmarks of the 
First Amendment is that it should not be applied based on the 
identity of the speaker.189  The idea that a speaker who engages 
in the political process can be imprisoned for his or her conduct is 
the antithesis of what freedom of speech is all about and sadly 
brings to mind regrettably similar acts in our history such as the 
Alien and Sedition Acts.190  As noted above, there is likely to be 
very little change in corporate political activities after Citizens 
United because corporations have been participating in the 
political process despite the existence of the McCain-Feingold 
Act.  They just had to do so through their PACs.  After the dust 
settles, if Congress still believes that it is wrong to allow 
corporations and unions to use independent expenditures in 
support of or in opposition to a candidate for political office, they 
can certainly take appropriate action to address the problemso 
long as that action is not unconstitutional.   
 
 
189 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
190 See Alien and Sedition Acts, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
